


Military Muddling



Volume 13 Issue 3

Chestnut Lodge Wargames Group Newsletter

February 2002

Editorial

A thin issue, but hopefully you'll all get this one in reasonable time and so write loads more material for the next issue!

Contributions for Military Muddling

To: James Kemp, preferably by e-mail to milmud@chestnutlodge.org.uk but you can also send paper or disks to me at 19 Castlegreen Street, Dumbarton, G82 1HG (note change of address)



DEADLINE FOR NEXT ISSUE: 18 January 2002

Trevor Farrant (Events Organiser) 020 8577 2573
Mukul Patel (Games Organiser & Admin Officer)
Michael Dollin (Treasurer)

Chestnut Lodge Wargames Group

Date	Venue	Game	Author	Blurb
Sun 3 Feb 2002	Bedford Park Pub from 12:00	ACW Game tryout	?Mukul	Tryout of a system for a megagame to be run at SELWG.
		Massive Attack	Mukul	the battle of Kharkov 1942. From Octobers conference. A fairly simple and hopefully quick figure game.
		Third World War at Sea	Rob Cooper	links in with Rob's "Third World War in Europe in 20 die rolls" game. He'll bring the dodgy components along to see if anyone has a spare 45 minutes or so.
		Nightmare in Detroit	Jim Wallman	A fast play version of the riot game - should take about 15 minutes
Sun 3 Mar 2002	Bedford Park Pub from 12	Games required		

Venues

Jim Wallman's Office

The Wells
7-15 Rosebery Avenue
London EC1R 4SP
Telephone: 020 7841 3660

You need to press the button for "One Plus One Partnership" to get in. Nearest train station is probably Farringdon.

Bedford Park Pub

The pub is located on Streatham High Road opposite Streatham Station. It opens from 12:00 and the games will be in the upstairs room.

Games Organiser

Message From Mukul

Email mukulpatel@37.com
Phone 020 8769 0538
Post 215 Valley Road
London SW16 2AF

Things I need when you do make an offer

- Participant numbers how many people do you need
- Venue - how many rooms needed, equipment needed such as tables or phones or intercoms etc,
- Is the session (game or whatever) ready to go and be included in the programme or is it still under development. If it is still under preparation when will it be ready
- When do you want to put it on or when do not want it put on.
- How much time do you want

Letters to the Editor

No one wrote to me this time except to say that they didn't have milmud. Some of you will have two issues in this mailing.

On/Offside Reports

Boundaries and Borders, Brian Cameron

Nick Luft

I was mostly an observer in this game; later joining with Mukul to form a military autocracy. Mukul took most of the decisions.

The system was easy to work, the players grasped the rules quickly and were able to move through the order of play, pushing the game on.

I have a few criticisms, some of which I made during the game. Mostly specific points about the number crunching side of the game. Since the game I would like to make the following comments.

1. Trevor had a frustrating game because he was not able to roll a 1 on the dice for several turns. Last time I played this game I made the point that once one country develops it becomes easier for the other countries to do so. Perhaps this system can be extended to allow players who are attempting the same roll to improve their chance to achieve it with every additional turn.

2. The game started at a sort of Year 0, with all players with the same level of

technology, size of armies etc. I realise that Brian is just testing a game, but I feel the game should never be tested with such a start-up. All countries should have some size and development from the start.

3. Players might be given so many points which to allocate to their starting positions, so they could choose whether to go for a strong economy or a large army, but not both. It might become obvious from such a play test which elements are strongest and this could enable their relative strengths to be readjusted.

4. Brian has achieved a simple system that gives players choice, some decisions and time to indulge in a little diplomacy. There is a reasonable mix of randomness and control that reflects the statesman's eternal problem of only being able to steer their country's future.

Rheinenbung, Dave Boudy Nick Luft

As one of the map umpires I was able to sit in the centre of the spider's web and watch this game develop. And very entertaining it was too. Now I have watched the game I would like to take part in another naval game like this as a player.

My comments are in two parts. The first are in answer to some of Dave's points in his Onside Report and the second part are specific points about running such games.

At the end of Dave's Onside Report, he wonders what to do next. If Dave thinks about running the game again I would suggest that if he goes for a longer game, he consider the following point. The missing link in Rheinenbung is that the action, around the Bismarck, is really is a game that should be played out in turns lasting a few hours, whilst the submarine / commerce raider game is really a campaign setting, which will develop only over turns of days if not months. The problem of course is that there could well

be two games being played at two speeds. Perhaps Dave should choose which he wants to concentrate on.

If Dave was to go for a smaller and shorter game – just the action around the Bismarck, the rest of the naval units could have auto-generated movement, in effect providing a background that the major surface units might have to consider. I wonder too if Dave wanted to extend his historical range and simplify the game even further that he considers recreating one of the World War 1 games - no planes, no radar, less-effective submarines, just lots of iron ships with big guns.

The last part of my Report concerns some of the technical problems being a map umpire. I will set them out as lessons learned:

1. Decide on a map marking convention.
2. Practice some map marking and movement tracking before the game starts.
3. Two people cannot easily mark-up the map at the same time. One person is best employed as a gopher, message runner and general assistant. The other does the map. These roles can change to enable one to have a rest.
4. The map marker is in charge.

A general problem often encountered in map games of this type is that all players and sometimes the umpires get confused about game time. Even during rigid megagames players are a little confused about what the actual game time. In a naval game of this sort, knowing the game time is crucial for writing and implementing orders and timing reports back. I do not have a ready solution to this, beyond having rigid turn structures, and perhaps a dedicated message umpire, whose only role is to receive, time and

transmit messages – which is a little boring, but very useful.

Against the Nature of Gentleness - (ATNOG), Onside Review
Nick Luft

Background

Against the Nature of Gentleness (ATNOG) was my latest attempt to design a club sized game on the Wars of the Roses. Most of the combat and the maps were adapted from my earlier Megagame, Shameless & Impudent Lords (SIL). After SIL I felt that I could loose a lot of SIL and still have a game.

I ran an earlier version of ATNOG in Chesterfield, in May 2001, with Jerry Elsmore and Dave London's assistance. I decided to slightly re-write ATNOG for CLWG. My main changes were to shorten the game turn to represent half a week rather than two weeks, and to introduce popular support.

Narrative

The scenario I choose was the return of Edward IV, to reclaim his throne, in 1471. I choose this period because of its fluid nature. Very few nobles had remained loyal to one side and most had either tacitly or actively supported both sides. I thought such a background would excuse players from having to read their briefs and enable players to approach the game without needing to "know" the background.

I was a little surprised by the events in the game. The Lancastrians seemed sunk in a kind of depression – "we're going to lose" – from the start. The Earl of Warwick, Jim Wallman, was sufficiently double-dealing to convince Edward IV, Rob Cooper, to take him back and things then started looking very grim for the Lancastrians. The rest of the non-aligned nobles hung around seeing which way the wind was blowing.

The only fight was between the Earl of Northumberland, Mukul Patel, and Edward IV. Northumberland quarrelled with Edward IV, for apparently trying to "order him about". "But he's the King, that's what they do!" They skirmished ineffectually and then decided to retire to lick their wounds. At this point Queen Margaret, non-player character, landed in Pembroke, with money and troops, to a loyal Lancastrian welcome. This seemed to inspire the old Lancastrian lords and with the detached Earl of Northumberland, then busy recruiting Scottish mercenaries, it looked like we were going to get a scrap, but it also seemed a good point to end it.

Some Criticisms

I attempted to introduce the game rules by simply running the game. The order of play was fairly straightforward, with movement, order and fighting sections - so I hoped players' would discover the rules as we went along. This approach worked for some, but not all the players – some players accusing me of adding rules as I went along and several being confused by the growing rule set. I felt the non-CLWG members were perhaps expecting a "game" rather than the usual CLWG experimental approach. I will not use this approach again. Next time I will introduce rules with a demonstration turn, with explanations.

Some Comments on Game Psychology

The more I design and run the game, the more I am convinced that the game setting, the seating, table layout has more impact on the game than the rules; the psychology of game play. Maybe I am a little naïve in expecting a game system to run apart from the players.

A major difference between this game and the Megagame and the earlier Chesterfield game is that I opted to use one large map, with all players seated around it. In Chesterfield and during SIL I used the tried

and tested multi-table layout. Round the single table, players occupy their seat and space; too much is known and debated. With multi-table games, players become isolated and start to worry, information being patchy.

Other Game Notes

Despite writing two levels of combat rules, one for large-scale battles, and the other for low-level skirmishing, I still encounter situations that the rules don't cover. During the game there was an attempt to infiltrate and attack the Tower of London.

I think these situations arise in Megagames and CLWG club games because there is an umpire. In a boardgame you can only work within the game system, but with an umpire to intercede, you are able to cook up wizard wheezes, and get a hearing. The problem with these schemes is that they are often crucial. The attempt on the Tower of London would have meant the Lancastrians would be able to release Henry VI from captivity. I am not sure of the solution to making rulings on these wizard wheezes. I have heard long paeans of whinging after megagames after a player felt unduly picked on after a successful wizard wheeze. Often some of the criticism being directed at the umpires for letting it happen.

I think I know how to control these situations: separate the participants, explain to each side the options and rough chance of success; get them to decide, write it down, reassemble the participants, explain the situation and then roll the dice. Avoid situations where one player says: - if he does that I do this.

But I would like to somehow reduce their impact. Perhaps these sort of games, which are in effect individual leaders and their gangs fighting, encourage extraordinary situations?

Changes to ATNOG

I found several areas that I will want to modify next time, I run the game, if I run it again. I have no plans to do so at present. Most are minor adjustments.

One area I will consider changing will be to move away from the traditional Order of Play, in which all players move at the same time, recruit units together etc. Instead I would like to experiment with a system that gives players the choice of perhaps one or two actions per turn – you can choose to either recruit units, move units, engage in diplomacy or negotiations, seek local support, raise finances etc. The only exception would be that combat would always occur as movement dictated. I would hope this way players would not have to wait for the order of play to move on so they can act, and perhaps they would focus on making the best choice out of a limited selection.

- Why do things in a game order? - because it is easier to follow a strict order of play than remember previous actions – game history
- Small-scale scraps are always present, and always hard
- Maps too small
- Movement together – several Lords as one Army
- Psychology of round table as opposed to open play
- Movement – a minus for every three units, from a dice roll
- Support!!!
- Too mechanical a system, recruitment too many die rolls and turns for no extra effect. All spend the same time gathering troops.
- Boxes on map to show
- - support available
- - retainers too recruit (that or a card system)
- food to harvest?
- too much explaining by me, should have gone through the rules.

- Offices need special effects and abilities explaining in greater detail
- Recruit – do it by paying in advance, and setting time to appear, pay cash and collect
- Jim and ship move – need to work a better method - recruit ships as above, pay up and ask it turn up when needed.... need for an emergency recruitment for running away.
- Support
 - - raise the anti level too make it more common
 - - How often to test for support
 - - give levies instead of retainers, these worth half one retainer / merc
- Skirmish – check the levels – 0-3 seems too large, all scraps to be inconclusive – what happens when you get inconclusive
- Actions – player has choice of action, stop traditional order of play. You can either choose
 - Recruit
 - Move
 - Seek local support
 - Diplomacy

Against the Nature of Gentleness, Offside Report

Andrew Hadley

I also had a lot of fun with Nick Luft's playtest. The game seemed to flow at a decent speed despite the number of players and different actions being taken. I agree that in a game like Nick's the hardest task is getting the complex situations resolved with sufficient detail to be satisfying but without slowing the rest of the game down. The card system in encounters seemed to answer that problem as it allows some choice to the players without letting the situation break down.

As for the recruitment problem - I would suggest that you have a pool for each region, with a total of funds and men to be recruited. This pool could be replenished every year, or every season, and perhaps retainers melting away after battles could

also be added to this pool. Money spent on raising support in a region could also go to the pool, perhaps after being discounted.

A cheeky question - what about siege guns? We didn't get to see your system for resolving siege-type situations. From what I can remember, this type of problem didn't arise very often - at Wakefield in 1460 Richard of York was lured out, and slaughtered in an ambush. Was it the strength of artillery that lead to this lack of sieges (surprising given the investment in castles by the nobility), or was it simply too difficult to maintain forces in the field long enough to mount a siege? This would fit in well with the high support costs you seem to be using. I suppose another reason for avoiding being besieged was the lack of trust - once the enemies are let in, you're dead (or worse).

For instance, you might have thought that Edward in 1470 might have tried his luck holding on in one of the stronger castles - but he fled, and thus lost all chance of rallying support to him until he returned. In the end he was pretty lucky, I think, to get another chance having fled so quickly.

Book Reviews

Alanbrooke's War Diaries ***Andy Grainger***

War Diaries 1939-1945

Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke

Edited by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001
£25.00 hbk, pp761 ISBN 0-297-60731-6

As many of you will know, these Diaries first appeared in a heavily expurgated form in the late 50's as The Turn of the Tide and Triumph in the West in a joint venture by Sir Arthur Bryant and Alanbrooke himself. This is their first appearance in a complete edition although I understand that some

extracts appeared last year in one of the Sunday newspapers.

Doubtless the newspapers will have selected those passages most critical of Churchill or the allies but there will be little of that nature that will come as a surprise. What does emerge are the day-by-day jottings of probably our finest and most intelligent soldier in WW2 right through the war. He does not know, as we all do, what the result will be at the final whistle or, of course, when that whistle will be blown.

Brooke served in the Great War in the Royal Artillery (so many members of the Royal Regiment are, as you know, highly intelligent people) and on the staff between the wars. He was Director of Army Training in 1936/37. At the outbreak of war he commanded II Corps in the BEF followed rapidly by the "second BEF" which Churchill insisted should be despatched to Cherbourg. Utterly opposed to this operation he contrived to close it down and evacuate the tens of thousands of rear area troops between Rouen and Brittany. In June 1940 he was made C-in-C Home Forces and thus would have played the key role in defeating Operation Sea Lion had it been launched. In November 1941 he was made Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), a post that he held until 1946.

His outlook is therefore from a senior level and the picture of the development of operations (initially) and then strategy is a fascinating one. As ever, one is reminded of the importance of the interplay of personalities. I suspect (hope) that a person with a background in Personnel issues would draw the conclusion that in a world where there are no right answers the critical thing is to find people who can work together, no matter with how many difficulties. As someone who has been known to criticise the abilities of players in megagames, Alanbrooke reminds me once

more of how accurate they in fact are. A few random examples:

12 June 1940 (i.e. as France is collapsing) Weygand [who had been called out of retirement] turned to me and said, "*I had finished my military career which had been a most successful one.*" I remained dumb and unable to make any adequate remark, it seemed impossible that the man destined to minister to France in her death agonies should be thinking of his military career.

19 August 1940

In the afternoon Roger Evans came to see me to ask why he had been removed from the Armoured Division. This resulted in an unpleasant interview.

8 October 1941

It is lamentable how poor we are as regards Army and Corps Commanders. We ought to remove several but heaven knows where we shall find anything very much better.

12 October 1941

PM very dissatisfied with our appreciation [about a proposal to invade Norway]! Told me that he was expecting a detailed plan for the operation and instead of that I had submitted as masterly treatise on all the difficulties!

7 July 1942

Cabinet meeting. A dreadful exhibition of amateur strategy by Cabinet Ministers! [Bevin,] Eden and Cripps offering criticism as if they were leading authorities on strategy!

13 July 1942

Eden suggested I should...cook [the] Court of Enquiry [about the fall of Tobruk] to ensure the commander was exonerated! I suggested the Court of Enquiry must report true verdict, this could be kept secret...

21 January 1943

[On the debate as to whether to invade Sicily or Sardinia] When an operation has

finally been completed it all looks so easy but so few people ever realise the infinite difficulties of maintaining an object or plan and refusing to be driven off it... for a thousand good reasons!

This entry could have been written at almost any time. There are constant arguments about strategic priorities and operations even after they have supposedly been agreed, such as at Casablanca.

And so it goes on, fresh insights on each page. The diaries make excellent reading for anyone considering a game set at the strategic level. The issues I would pick out as the ones that occupied Brooke most as CIGS are:

- Setting the strategic priorities and then sticking to them
- Keeping the politicians onside
- Keeping his subordinates informed
- Working with the allies, i.e. the Americans after Pearl Harbour

This seems simple but in a coalition war with a democratic government there is a vast amount of consultative work to agree and then stick by the strategic priorities. But although CIGS Alanbrooke is not head of the three services (although he would like to be!), he is merely the man who represents the Armed Forces to the Prime Minister. Thus we read constantly about the Air Force concentrating its resources on building bombers on the grounds that it will be able to defeat Germany on its own. In fact, there is little of specific naval interest in the diaries and of the air only when they impinge on the army.

Alanbrooke's role is to try to keep the imperfect team working. Even so far as the army is concerned, he does not get involved in detail with the man on the ground, even at a senior level, such as Wavell or Auchinleck. He can only leave them to get on with the job, monitoring their performance and replacing them only

if they don't perform and he has someone who could do a better job.

The entry for 31st March 1942 is one of the very few in which he reveals doubts about winning the war; he feels that the Empire is collapsing and he can do nothing to stop it. Even then he can do more than argue for and allocate his resources and hope for success. Although there are references to Ultra, described as intercepts or intelligence, there are some interesting perspectives, which form the basis of the assumptions on which resources would be allocated. He also says that the Russians are so secretive that the only information comes from German intercepts.

At high levels it seems that no one had much confidence in the French in 1940 and just hoped the Germans would wait until 1941 to allow us to build up. It is on that basis, of course, that the decisions were made to go ahead with an advanced air defence system in the late 1930's rather than choosing to base the RAF in France. After Dunkirk the strategic priority was to secure the islands against invasion and this was a concern until after Stalingrad. Until then, there were major concerns as to whether Russia could hold out and the concerns in summer 1942 for the safety of the Middle East oilfields were very real. By contrast, the Far East seems to have been regarded, in the last resort, as expendable.

The other person who comes out in this book, of course, is Alanbrooke the man. Ascetic military intellectual he may have been but his true joys are his wife, for whom he is writing the diary and his children, and ornithology. The happiness revealed by these entries is as moving as the drama of the visits to the Middle East after Tobruk or the Casablanca Conference to decide on the conduct of the war.

This book is worth the full price of £25 but you may well see it in a remainder bookshop, as I did, at around a tenner.

Black Hawk Down, Mark Bowden

Corgi, 1999 £6.99 pbk, pp570 ISBN 0-552-14750-8

Andy Grainger

Mark Bowden is a journalist on that well-known organ, the *Philadelphia Enquirer*. His previous writings include columns for *Playboy*, *Rolling Stone* and *Sports Illustrated*. He has no military credentials whatever. Black Hawk Down is his highly researched and detailed account of a helicopter raid by US Special Forces in Mogadishu on 3rd/4th October 1993. It is a real page-turner that carries the reader along at a full speed particularly if, like most of us, you don't know the story.

This action in Mogadishu was the biggest firefight in which US soldiers were involved since Vietnam. In a brief period of optimism following the end of the cold war and the successful conclusion of the Gulf War the US felt sufficiently confident to intervene on the ground in some of the world's troublespots. In Somalia the UN were undertaking an operation to deliver food to a civilian population trapped between feuding warlords, a situation familiar to those who have played Jim Wallman's megagame Crisis in Binni!

During his last days in office President Bush (senior) had approved Operation Restore Hope for the dispatch to Somalia of some 28,000 American troops. He styled it a humanitarian exercise, and in December 1992 US Marines landed safely in Mogadishu, with the aim of turning control of the operation over to the UN as soon as possible. The Clinton administration, however, supported a UN resolution of March 26, 1993, that expanded the mission to include "*the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia.*" Madeleine

Albright lauded this effort at state building as "*an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country.*"

Unfortunately this bold agenda began to unravel very quickly when, on October 3-4, the Americans in Mogadishu attempted an audacious heli-borne raid to capture the General Muḥammad Farah Aydid, a warlord of whom they did not approve (see below as to why not!). Although technically a success, in that many of Aydid's top people were captured, 18 Americans were killed, 73 wounded, two helicopters shot down and two American corpses were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu before television cameras.

This book is the story of the operation called, by the Americans, The Battle of the Black Sea after the nearby teeming market in central Mogadishu and by the Somalis *Maalinti Rangers* (The Day of the Rangers). The operation has received very little coverage in the United States, even officially, as it was deemed to be a failure. Consequently the author has undertaken a great deal of his own research and has managed to interview a great many of the participants. He even travelled to Somalia in 1997 and managed to talk to some of the Somalis who were involved – apparently, though, this angle is entirely missing from the film which is about to appear as I write.

It is interesting that many of the Somalis (or "skinnies") described the Americans as inhuman since with their goggles, body armour and colossal firepower no part of them seemed to be human. Is it ironic or just inevitable that the early days of the New World Order should witness a battle between Imperial Space Marines and "skinnies". And yet for all its research and knowledge, the author does not draw this obvious comparison.

What is brought out, however, is that three months prior to the Battle of the Black Sea,

the Imperial Marines had ambushed Aydid's headquarters with heliborne TOW missiles. In fact, Aydid was not present – but most of his clan elders were and they were discussing Aydid's extremist policies that had led to the ambushing of UN soldiers and the assassination of Somalis working for the UN. Around 20 of them, mostly moderates, were killed and the clan leadership, in effect, declared war on the USA. A great many Somalis supported them. As so often in these instances, Aydid was well known to the Americans in a previous life. He was popular for having led the coup in 1989 against the former President Barre and, indeed, his son was a US Marine reservist serving in Somalia!

This is an exciting book about a fascinating situation. The scenario could be set in any time from the distant past to, as I have indicated, the far future. It would have been familiar to any commander from Julius Caesar to Lord Kitchener. They would have been far less comfortable, however, with the immense burden that modern communications and the mass media place on both government and the man on the spot. There seems to be no time to think and, at the same, an unprecedented demand to “do something”. The book would benefit from a timeline or chronology for reference and, as ever, it would be good to have more from the “skinnies” side but the author explains the difficulties he had in this regard.

And this morning the New Statesman carries a review of a book entitled Rogue State, a Guide to the World's only Superpower. Be afraid, be very afraid...

[I've also just finished reading BHD and would wholeheartedly recommend it to you all. An absolutely gripping story and written in the way that makes you grudge interruptions.]

How could WW2 have been Different? A postscript following a reading of the Alanbrooke diaries

Andy Grainger

Brooke's strategic priorities were:

1. Home Defence
2. Clear North Africa and open up the Mediterranean to save 1m tons of shipping
3. Invade France – since a large invasion against Germany was not possible in 1943 then Italy was attacked as the best way of helping Russia, diverting German forces and knocking Italy out of the war.

As we can see, he got his way.

He also had other issues to consider.

- Shipping was an absolutely key factor. There are many references to it. The availability of shipping governed all troop movements and is why clearing the Mediterranean was seen as so important. It freed up 1m tons of shipping which is about three North Atlantic convoys. This does not seem much but it clearly was regarded as such. As part of this, the Navy had to master the U-boat threat.
- There were certain vital raw materials. The Persian oilfields at Abadan were seen as vital, even more vital than the Suez Canal. Had Rommel broken through at El Alamein then defence would have concentrated on the oilfields
- Air was seen as critical in modern war. There are many entries concerning his efforts to get more resources for aircraft to give direct support to the army. These are simply unsuccessful; people such as Portal believe that they can win the war on their own with bombing.
- Manpower was short. Mechanised war (and airpower) were seen as the weapons of the future so the British army was run down after Dunkirk in

favour of airpower and infantry divisions were broken up and the units converted to AA and armour. Of course, later in the war they were converted back to infantry.

- The Far East was seen as expendable. There was also a constant tussle with the US not to divert too much to the Pacific.

I think that Alanbrooke's greatest contributions were restraining Churchill and the other politicians and also managing the entry of the Americans. Churchill wanted to conduct lots of small operations, like the wargamer who wants something to do; the Americans wanted to invade Europe as soon as possible.

So without Alanbrooke I think there would have been a larger number of smaller operations, similar to the "Breaking Windows with Golden Guineas" of Pitt's administration during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Most would have been just as unsuccessful since Germany would have controlled the air. Thus we actually had operations in Norway 1940, Greece 1941, Dieppe 1942 and the Dodecanese in 1943. If Churchill had been allowed more choice then there would have been further operations such as the Lofoten Islands but bigger and on the Norwegian mainland, more Dieppe's although not necessarily as disastrous, possibly troops sent direct to help the Russians via Persia. Commanders in North Africa would have been put under greater pressure and so there might have been more smaller battles than fewer large ones.

So far as the Americans were concerned, I think they would have tried to launch an invasion in Europe much more quickly. Imagine Torch in, say, Brittany rather than North Africa. And, of course, the U-boat threat had not been surmounted by then.

If operations like this had been launched then I don't think that the overall course of

the war would have changed greatly but I think it would have taken longer and the Russians would have done even more work than they actually did. In other words the outcome would have been more like 1814.

Any more thoughts, anyone?

Expected Issue Dates for Military Muddling in 2002

Issue	Deadline	Post date	Meeting [1]
March	15 February 2002	18 February 2002	Sun 3 March 2002
April	22 March 2002	25 March 2002	6-7 April 2002
May	19 April 2002	22 April 2002	Sat 4 May 2002
June	17 May 2002	20 May 2002	Sun 2 June 2002
July	21 June 2002	24 June 2002	Sat 6 July 2002
August	19 July 2002	22 July 2002	Sun 4 August 2002
September	23 August 2002	26 August 2002	Sat 7 September 2002
October	20 September 2002	23 September 2002	5-6 October 2002

[1] All dates for meetings need to be confirmed by the Admin Officer.

Game designers are strongly encouraged to submit previews and general briefing in advance to stimulate interest in their session. Preferred format is typed in plain text, preferably by e-mail, but you can send me bits of paper, floppy disks, CDs, or whatever other medium you can get hold of. I shall award a prize for the most notable submission at the end of the year.

Articles can be sent by e-mail to: <mailto:milmud@chestnutlodge.org.uk> or by post to James Kemp, 19 Castlegreen Street, Dumbarton, G82 1HG